“India should seize the present moment, as it will get the best possible deal from Pakistan, and time is running out,” Munir Chowdhary, a former colleague of Murtaza Bhutto, the assassinated son of Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto, told me at his house in Mirpur area of Pakistan controlled Jammu and Kashmir in January 2006. Mr. Chowdhary’s family was originally from the Chhamb area of Jammu & Kashmir, a part of which was given to Pakistan as a result of the delineation of the Line of Control (LoC), and they had migrated across the LoC during the 1965 war.
I paid little attention to his words, as I had a more important task: to make use of the rare opportunity that had come my way to do unhindered research and collect reports for this paper. Unlike the trips facilitated for Indians by the Pakistani establishment — or vice versa — as part of track-two engagements or otherwise, which are controlled and monitored, I had applied for the LoC permit and, surprisingly, got permission to visit Pakistan-controlled Jammu and Kashmir, and Pakistan. Pakistan had announced that with the LoC permit, one could travel anywhere within the country. This lucky opportunity to travel anywhere in Pakistan, which arguably hadn’t existed for several decades for an Indian journalist, came directly as a result of the 2005 Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) under the leadership of Dr. Manmohan Singh.
Manmohan Singh: Life and legacy of India’s reformist Prime Minister
Dr. Singh’s achievements in office including the progressive legislations such as the MNREGA and the Forest Rights Act, his deft handling of the economy — particularly during the U.S. financial crisis of 2008 — and his big breakthrough in the form of the U.S.-India nuclear deal have been well-documented. But his engagement on Jammu & Kashmir and Pakistan has not been as discussed, perhaps because it didn’t come to fruition, as the 2007 lawyers’ movement in Pakistan, the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008, and the youth unrest in the valley after 2008 made it impossible for the momentum to continue.
Nevertheless, the importance of that phase cannot be discounted, as it serves as a reference point for the future, when the time is opportune, and for those invested in the difficult exercise of peacebuilding elsewhere. As a first-hand eyewitness to the unfolding realities on the ground during that momentous period of the first decade of the 2000s, my own conversations with Dr. Singh gave me a rare opportunity to comprehend and witness the complicated nature of peacebuilding in that phase. With the India-Pakistan relationship remaining unresolved and, given the presence of nuclear arms in the equation, it continues to be a subject of global interest.
I joined The Hindu’s Jammu & Kashmir bureau in 2001 as a colleague of the late Shujaat Bukhari, who was assassinated in 2018. That year changed the global landscape after 9/11, and its echoes were felt in Jammu & Kashmir. Within a few days of 9/11, the Srinagar Legislative Assembly was attacked on October 1, 2001, followed by the attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. This led to Operation Parakram, a military buildup initiated by India along the LoC and the International Border. The following year was marked by another series of provocative terrorist attacks, such as the Raghunath Mandir attack in March 2002, and then the Kaluchak attack on the family members of Indian Army personnel at an Army camp near National Highway 1A on 14 May 2002.
Keeping in mind the fluid and violent context, there were fears of large-scale militant violence during the (then) upcoming 2002 Assembly elections. As Jammu & Kashmir headed into election mode, I met Dr. Singh at New Delhi’s India International Centre (IIC) in August 2002 at a fellowship event. He was the Leader of the Opposition in the Rajya Sabha. Just before the event started, the hostess introduced me and the other fellows to Dr. Singh, who was the chief guest on the occasion. As we were standing for tea before the event, Dr. Singh took me aside and asked me a few questions about Jammu & Kashmir and Pakistan. Dr. Singh had just been made the party in charge of Jammu & Kashmir by the Congress party. He listened to me patiently, asking follow-up questions, and wanting granular details. He then said it would be a mistake to reduce India-Pakistan relations to a flip-flop approach. He was referring to the National Democratic Alliance’s (NDA) Pakistan policy.
Two years passed, and in the 2004 Parliamentary elections, I met him in April at a campaign function, where I interviewed him for The Hindu. In the interview, published on April 24, he pressed for reforms with a human face. After the formal interview finished, he asked, “Young man, what is your assessment of Jammu & Kashmir and the India-Pakistan equation? And are we looking at peace anytime soon?” He was particularly interested in knowing the impact of the ceasefire along the LoC and the International Border, which had been announced in November 2003. He asked me about the details of divided families and their presence in various frontier areas of Jammu & Kashmir. I told him about my recent field trips to the Line of Control and the International Border areas and pointed out the tangible benefits of the peace. He said, “All this is fine, but we need to create incentives for sustainable peace. We need to put in place measures to ensure that spoilers in Pakistan are deterred.”
On May 22, 2004, Dr. Singh became India’s 13th Prime Minister. Under PM Vajpayee’s watch, India and Pakistan had already taken a few steps toward peace after the setbacks in Agra and Kargil. While Dr. Singh refrained from making any flamboyant statements on Pakistan in 2004, within a few months of taking over, the bureaucracy was set in motion in a particular direction vis-à-vis Pakistan.
Manmohan Singh: An easy boss with some mischievous humour
On 28 December 2005, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran visited Islamabad and, in a press conference, said, “The Indian side put forward a proposal for meetings of families/reunion of families in Kashmir at five places, on designated days and periods of time, under joint security arrangements. The places are Mendhar, Poonch, Suchetgarh, Uri, and Tangdhar along the Neelam Valley. Our Pakistani friends have told us they are willing to consider the proposal for allowing family reunions under joint arrangements.”
Dr. Singh had studied the subject of divided families in detail, including the nuances of the subject. He was also not oblivious to the concerns about cross-border terrorism. On March 11, 2005, in the Rajya Sabha, he said, “As I have said on many occasions and at various fora, we are willing to discuss all issues in this relationship, including Jammu & Kashmir. But the essential premise remains that our interlocutors will play their part in ensuring that cross-border terrorism ends and that the infrastructural support to such organisations is dismantled. We are, therefore, following the course of altruism, but with due caution.”
If one sifts through his statements or those of the foreign policy establishment, one finds little hesitation in discussing Jammu & Kashmir, but at the same time, remaining firm on India’s position on cross-border terrorism. It is with clarity of vision and confidence about the Indian position that the idea that borders cannot be changed but can be made soft originated. At the heart of it are the initiatives to address the humanitarian needs of the people of divided Jammu & Kashmir. In Jammu & Kashmir, he was firm in saying that there is zero tolerance for human rights violations.
Dr. Singh was also not completely indifferent to the difficult choices faced by his interlocutor on the Pakistani side, who was dealing with the pressure from militant outfits and other elements in the Pakistani polity, including the military. Incidentally, Dr. Singh was born into a Khatri family, a Punjabi community of traders and administrators, in Jhelum district, better known as the Pothwar belt, which adjoins the Rawalpindi-Islamabad area. In this region, joining the Army has been a tradition for Rajputs and Jats ever since western Punjab, now Pakistani Punjab, became one of the prime recruiting grounds for the British Indian Army after the 1857 mutiny. Several senior Pakistan Army commanders, including one of the Army chiefs, Asif Nawaz, hail from this area.
Manmohan Singh — a hero of Indian middle class
The shadow of militancy consistently chased Dr. Singh’s initiatives, including the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus. It never deterred him, but there was no room for complacency. On April 4, 2005, at the crack of dawn, several passengers planning to travel from various parts of the Indian side of Jammu & Kashmir on the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus were whisked away to a heavily guarded location by security agencies in Srinagar. The day before, the Tourist Reception Centre in Srinagar had been attacked, and Lashkar-e-Taiba had taken responsibility. Some of the Pakistani correspondents stationed in New Delhi also came to report on the flag-off ceremony. A day before, we were speculating in Srinagar whether the event would be postponed or whether Dr. Singh would come. But it seems as if Dr. Singh had decided that the initiative, which had already led to a groundswell of support, could not be reversed and that his presence was necessary.
When Dr. Singh invoked Kabul in his Srinagar speech while flagging off the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus on a rainy morning, he broadened the idea of regional reconciliation and included Afghanistan in its ambit. This wasn’t lost on the Western audience. He said that he hoped his grandchildren would see a day when one could have breakfast in Delhi, lunch in Lahore, and dinner in Kabul, just as it had been.
Dr. Singh was constantly in search of ideas to create incentives for peace. Growing up in Amritsar as a partition survivor and later becoming an economist of international repute, it is difficult to believe that he wouldn’t have been affected by how border areas, which were once bustling trade routes, had become pale shadows of the past. Along the Radcliffe Line, there are several border areas such as Faridkot, Jammu, Gurdaspur, or even areas near the LoC, that have suffered the fallout of partition and have become mere shadows of what they once were. The intra-LoC trade, which germinated in 2007, continued until the 2019 Pulwama attack. It has since been stopped altogether owing to allegations of money-laundering from the Indian side.
Another facet that cannot be ignored is the momentous boost to people-to-people contacts and several track-two initiatives during Dr. Singh’s tenure. He was aware of the post-independence trajectory of Pakistan and recognised that to conflate the state with the people was a flawed policy choice. During Zia-ul-Haq’s rule in the 1980s, many activists, poets, lawyers, and journalists in urban areas waged a democratic struggle at the cost of personal victimisation. They were bold enough to openly criticise Zia’s leadership for sponsoring religious extremism in society and curtailing civil liberties, particularly women’s rights. Some of the famous Urdu plays, popular in the subcontinent, made immediately after Zia’s death, immortalised these struggles.
During that phase, Pakistanis inclined towards peace visited India. In many cases, as this author is personally aware, last-minute visa applications of Pakistani passport holders were cleared at the top echelons of Dr. Singh’s administration. This made the task of those carrying out track-two engagements easier, and there was no need to hold these events outside the region, which often proves to be a futile exercise of elite interaction with little societal grounding.
Manmohan Singh left a lasting imprint on India’s external relations
Another significant event during Dr. Singh’s tenure was the visit of Pakistani journalists to Jammu and Kashmir from October 3 to 9, 2004, on the invitation of the Indian chapter of the South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA). The visit gave media personnel an understanding of the diversity of opinions existing in the region, in contrast to the unidimensional concept of the region that the Pakistani state had promoted and amplified for decades. A few months later, a delegation from the Indian side visited Pakistan and toured the Mirpur and Muzaffarabad areas of Pakistani-controlled Jammu & Kashmir, including meeting with Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf.
After the visits, one could see a visible change in the narrative on India and Pakistan from both sides. For instance, when Pakistani journalists came to India, they were struck by the cultural and linguistic differences they had with the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley, in contrast to the more commonalities shared with the Hindu-majority Jammu region, which adjoins the Sialkot district of Pakistan. This was owing to the common language and culture between the two regions.
Keeping this background in perspective, what are the lessons of Dr. Singh’s legacy as a peace builder in the present context? The 2025 context is no longer the same.
First, the gap between the economies of India and Pakistan continues to widen as the Indian economy gains more global traction on account of its breadth, size, and resilience. This has implications for Pakistan. This was illustrated by the reported admission by then Pakistani Army chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa in 2021 that the Pakistani military didn’t have the resources to fight with India. Connected with the issue of dialogue with India is the ability and resolve of the present coalition government in Pakistan to rein in transnational violent extremists — one of India’s main concerns.
Second, there was a time when several New Delhi-based members of political and bureaucratic echelons had personal knowledge of and networks within Pakistan. It is not a coincidence that most of the initiatives at the bureaucratic, political, and civil-society levels were initiated by members of the Punjabi-speaking community, who were first-generation migrants from across the Radcliffe Line in 1947. Imbued with knowledge of the cultural, intellectual, and linguistic nuances of the Pakistani Punjabi elite, New Delhi benefitted from this ecosystem to calibrate its responses to an overall fraught relationship. With the passing of Dr. Manmohan Singh and many others, this ecosystem has almost vanished in the last decade.
That is why, in the changed context, the exercise of peace-building should factor in the new realities, apart from learning from the past. In this respect, some of the instruments of peace-building remain consistent. For instance, a more liberal visa regime is vital to create a constituency of peace. There is no cost attached to this. Critics point out that, in the last 30 years, no state-to-state peace initiative with Pakistan has been a risk-free endeavor for any Indian political elite because of the possibility of an impending terrorist attack. That is why it is important to keep the civil society channel open to get a broader understanding of the issues and concerns on either side and not expose the state-to-state domain too soon.
Third,the idea of peace means little if it is devoid of a nuanced understanding of societal components and history. Many parts of northern India, including Punjab, the Jammu plains, Delhi, and, to a smaller extent, Mumbai, were deeply impacted by the inflow and outflow of populations during Partition in 1947. On the Indian side, the relatively larger available area for migrant settlements provided some respite. However, significant urban areas were transformed overnight. The sheer scale of new migrants radically influenced popular culture and even shaped the political traits around these new settlements. Until a few years ago, depending on where a Partition-impacted family lived in populous Delhi, it was often easy to pinpoint the place in present-day Pakistani Punjab from where the family originated.
In the same vein, one often underestimates the continued impact of Partition on domestic politics. In the hinterlands of eastern and central Pakistani Punjab, many residents belong to families that migrated from India during Partition. This is particularly significant in Pakistan, given its smaller size and the dominance of Punjab over other provinces in terms of size, resources, and representation in elite institutions. These migrants are predominantly settled in urban areas such as Lahore, Sialkot, Lyallpur (now Faisalabad), Montgomery (now Sahiwal), and Gujranwala.
For this reason, promoting comparative analyses by scholars and researchers within an interdisciplinary framework could foster a better understanding of each other’s societal and political landscapes, thereby enriching the policymaking process. Inter-university exchange programs for scholars are one potential avenue to explore in this regard. There is no harm in encouraging some of the recent trends through quiet, prudent policy interventions by both sides. When the time comes for macro-level changes, such as the restoration of diplomatic ties, a more informed and networked group of stakeholders could act as a force multiplier in supporting efforts toward normalisation. Simultaneously, a greater understanding of societal nuances would make policymaking more original and pragmatic, without raising unrealistic expectations too soon. However, without rigorous fieldwork at the societal level, even the best scholarly efforts face severe limitations and risk lacking legitimacy.
Next, one cannot discount the role of social media and technology. Both countries have young populations, with India’s median age at 28.4 and Pakistan’s at 22.8. Over the last decade, despite bilateral relations remaining at their lowest ebb, there has been an explosion of digital oral histories centered on Partition stories, particularly from younger members of the Indian and Pakistani diaspora communities. Despite constraints, the internet has enabled creative projects that bridge the divide. Various social media initiatives have reunited hundreds of families and friends across both sides of Punjab who were separated in 1947. These efforts humanize the tragedy of the bitter divide and can serve as a mitigating factor against the forces of extremism that seek to exploit it.
And last but not the least, both the Pakistan Muslim League(N) [(PML-N)] and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), having been victims of the military establishment in different contexts, understand that its support is not without risks. Given the structural constraints — and, to be fair to both parties, now coalition partners — they have made some bold efforts to reach out to India over the last two and a half decades. However, various acts of terrorism by outfits with footprints in Pakistan and the Pakistani military’s misadventure in Kargil have derailed the process.
One of the main impediments remains the perennial obsession with Kashmir, which has created a situation where no party can afford to be seen as diluting its commitment to the issue. Unlike his brother, the younger Sharif has cleverly positioned himself as not crossing the redlines set by the Pakistani Army. This tactical alignment with the military gives them little maneuverability on key foreign policy or national security issues, particularly concerning India.
At the same time, both parties have their strengths and complement each other in governance. In terms of intellectual depth on policy issues, the PPP is better positioned, even though its current electoral influence is largely confined to Sindh province. While in power, the PPP passed the comprehensive 18th Amendment in 2010, which granted greater federal autonomy to the provinces and repealed the infamous 8th Amendment that had empowered the President to dismiss any elected government.
The PML-N, which combines capitalist economics with Islamist politics, remains pivotal in the context of India-Pakistan dialogue due to its strong roots in the central and eastern parts of the populous Punjab province. However, then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s attempts to engage with India in 1999 and 2015-16 were thwarted by the Kargil incursion and the Pathankot airbase terror attack, respectively. These past experiences will continue to shape the government’s initiatives, while the thinking within the upper echelons of the Pakistani Army will remain vital in determining the course of engagement with India.
In this context, Dr. Singh’s emphasis on creating economic incentives may resonate in the future. A 2017 World Bank report, Glass Half Full, noted that annual trade between India and Pakistan was worth $2,117 million at the time. The report argued that the potential for India-Pakistan trade could rise to $36,915 million annually. Much of the current trade between the two countries takes place via third countries such as Singapore and the UAE. A greater concerted effort should focus on the broader India-Pakistan trade dynamic rather than solely cross-LoC trade, as its potential to create substantial economic stakes for peace is limited. The idea of LoC trade failed to gain significant traction for several reasons.
Between 2008 and 2019, $1.2 Billion worth of barter trade was reportedly recorded along the two LoC points designated for such exchanges. The reasons for the limited success of this confidence-building measure (CBM) were evident. Pakistan-controlled Jammu and Kashmir, with a population nearly one-third that of Jammu and Kashmir on the Indian side, lacks an agricultural base due to its hilly topography and has a nascent industrial sector. The region’s economy is primarily remittance-based, with more than 70% of British Pakistanis having direct or indirect connections to the Pothwari-speaking areas of Pakistan-controlled Jammu and Kashmir, particularly Mirpur, as well as the adjoining linguistically akin areas such as Rawalpindi, Jhelum, or Gujarat in Pakistani Punjab.
From Jammu & Kashmir, which too lacks an industrial base, the goods traded are the traditional Kashmiri ones such as carpet rugs, handicrafts, papier-mâché, etc., and basmati rice from the plains of RS Pura that borders Sialkot district of Pakistan. Many of the 21 items listed for the cross-LoC trade, including bananas, tamarind, red chili, cumin, and pistachio, are not grown or are grown only limitedly on either side of the LoC. Ironically, these goods were coming from the rest of India or Pakistan and being traded along the LoC. Traders exploited the advantage of zero duty in contrast to the restrictive and high-tariff trade between India and Pakistan along Wagah.
Faced with this reality, and more importantly, the broadening of the conceptual framework of the CBM with regard to the movement of civilians is required. In this connection, it is important to open the logistically easier old Suchetgarh (Jammu)-Sialkot (Pakistan’s Punjab) route, which will benefit the bulk of families who left Jammu & Kashmir in 1947 for Pakistani Punjab. Actually, most of the Muslim migration from Jammu & Kashmir took place from its southern part and that too to Pakistan’s Punjab, not to Pakistan-controlled Jammu & Kashmir.
According to the 1948 West Punjab Refugees Census, the number of Muslims who migrated from Jammu and Kashmir — most of them from Jammu — was 2,02,600, the highest outside East Punjab. Muslims from the Jammu plains mostly settled in Sialkot and Lahore, though some families also settled in other Punjabi cities such as Gujranwala and Faisalabad. The number of people in Pakistan’s Punjab, including the succeeding generations of the 1947 migrants who have links with Jammu and Kashmir, is estimated to be around 1.5 million. This includes prominent Pakistani figures such as singer Malika Pukhraj and economist Mahbub ul Haq, known for his work at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in introducing the concept of the Human Development Index. Haq was a friend of former PM Singh.
These families, migrated from the southern part of Jammu & Kashmir to Pakistan — the highest migration outside East Punjab. Like the Hindus and Sikhs who migrated from Pakistan-controlled Jammu and Kashmir, these families’ interest is limited to a desire to visit ancestral places. The current Suchetgarh-Sialkot border post has already become a popular tourist destination on either side. The potential of a plain Suchetgarh-Sialkot route is huge, as it targets the heartland of Pakistan’s Punjab by reducing some of the monolithic conceptions of Punjabi Muslims about Jammu & Kashmir, which have been a key driver of violence and extremism in the region. It will also showcase Jammu & Kashmir’s huge diversity — ethnic, regional, and religious.
The terrorist attack on November 26, 2008, the day India’s financial capital was attacked, was a setback to Dr. Singh’s initiatives. I was with a family friend from the Mirpur area in the Pakistani community-dominated Midwood area of Brooklyn, New York, which is also known as “mini-Pakistan.” We had renewed connections in the context of the softening of the LoC after the 1947 bifurcation of Jammu & Kashmir. Collectively, we watched with horror on TV as the mayhem unfolded in Mumbai. It was clear that Dr. Singh’s peace efforts had taken a hit. My family friends were worried about their families still living in Mirpur, as they feared Indian retaliation. Dr. Singh had clearly decided against any retaliation and instead rallied a diplomatic offensive, which bore long-term results, such as the multilateral sanctions imposed by Financial Action Task Force (FATF.) It took Pakistan several years to come off the list.
Post-Mumbai attacks, there is no doubt that the developments that followed over the next seventeen years erased much of the peace momentum between the two countries, and Munir’s words from 2006 continue to echo in my ears. But, as history tells us, the context changes, and past efforts are not completely irrelevant. Dr. Singh’s institutionalised graduated approach, which sought to marry strategic vision with tactics rooted in the interdisciplinary granularity of history, economics, and society, provides future policymakers desiring to force peace with an excellent template for peacebuilding to complement their own efforts. The global community of peacebuilders should take inspiration from the efforts that were undertaken during the tenure of Dr. Singh as Prime Minister.
(Luv Puri has authored two books on Jammu & Kashmir, including Uncovered face of militancy and Across the Line of Control)
Published – January 13, 2025 04:50 pm IST