Interpreting the recent Bangladesh-Pakistan thaw

‘Recent bilateral engagement between the two sides demonstrates Dhaka’s intent to diversify its foreign policy trajectory in the subcontinent’
| Photo Credit: AFP

The bitter legacy of the 1971 liberation war, where Bangladesh split from Pakistan, has long steered the nature of ties between Dhaka and Islamabad. However, recent bilateral engagement between the two sides demonstrates Dhaka’s intent to diversify its foreign policy trajectory in the subcontinent. Since August 2024, after the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government following a student-led revolt, there have been several meetings between Muhammad Yunus, the Chief Adviser to the interim Bangladesh government, and Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. In contrast, the absence of any engagement between Mr. Yunus and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi sheds light on this shifting equation.

The ousting of Ms. Hasina set the stage for a potential recalibration in the region — one that is likely to unsettle New Delhi. During Ms. Hasina’s 15-year tenure, bilateral relations remained strained, partly due to her family’s historic grievances against Pakistan’s ruling class. Her close alliance with India likely emerged as a key factor for the continued frosty ties with Islamabad in the following years. Tensions between Bangladesh and Pakistan peaked in 2016, with both countries expelling diplomats.

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Recent developments

However, under the leadership of Mr. Yunus, there has been a strengthening of ties. Some key and recent developments underscore this. For instance, Bangladesh hosted a high-level Pakistani military delegation in Rangpur, located close to the strategically crucial Siliguri Corridor. This was followed by a rare visit by Lieutenant-general S.M. Kamr-ul-Hassan, the Bangladesh Army’s second-in-command, to Rawalpindi to meet with Pakistan’s Army, Navy, and Air Force chiefs. Dhaka has also announced the resumption of direct flights to Islamabad and also participated in Pakistan’s Aman 2025 naval exercises in the Arabian Sea (February 7-11), which included the deployment of a major Bangladeshi warship to Pakistan for the first time in over a decade.

Despite the apparent warming of relations, can these interactions translate into meaningful outcomes? Or will they remain symbolic with little tangible impact?

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The ground realities

While Mr. Yunus has watered down Dhaka’s demand that Pakistan to apologise for the “1971 genocide” to one merely seeking a “resolution of the issues”, Dhaka will face challenges in managing public opinion. A significant number of Bangladeshis still view the separation from Pakistan as a bedrock of their national identity. Without addressing this deeply ingrained historic grievance in the psyche of Bangladeshi society, substantial diplomatic progress appears unlikely in the long term. This remains especially true should Islamabad continue to frame the 1971 war as an Indian conspiracy rather than acknowledging it as a separatist movement that was a product of an expression of Bengali identity and in response to the excesses of the government in West Pakistan. In addition, from a strategic and economic perspective, a partnership with Islamabad will offer limited gains for Dhaka, particularly given the misalignment between the economic realities of both countries. The geographical separation of Bangladesh and Pakistan by Indian territory is further likely to create connectivity and political hurdles for smooth trade.

As India closely monitors the situation, the diplomatic manoeuvres will be perceived as Pakistan’s efforts to counter New Delhi’s faltering influence in Dhaka after Ms. Hasina’s ouster. Interestingly, these dynamics also coincide with India’s unprecedented pivot of warming relations with the ruling Taliban in Afghanistan, a traditional ally of Pakistan. Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, the acting foreign minister of the Taliban government, in Dubai, in January, which is the highest level of interaction between both sides ever since the group took control of Afghanistan in 2021.

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The outline of New Delhi’s approach

With the count of hostile neighbours now growing, which includes the Maldives and Nepal’s increasing alignment with China, does New Delhi have a new cause for concern?

India’s approach to Bangladesh should be grounded in an understanding of the economic and geographical realities. Despite the evolving nature of Dhaka-Islamabad ties, Bangladesh will find it challenging to adopt an overtly anti-India stance, given its geographic proximity and economic dependence on India. India remains Bangladesh’s leading trading partner in the region. In 2023, Indian exports to Bangladesh were $11.25 billion, while Bangladesh’s exports to India stood at approximately $2 billion in 2023. Many of these imports, particularly raw materials, are crucial for Bangladesh’s industries.

That said, India must remain vigilant: first, there is scope for an axis involving Bangladesh, China, and Pakistan, and second, on the issue of security in its northeast States. India must clarify its red lines with Bangladesh in critical areas such as terrorism, weapons trade, joint military drills, and maritime security. While remaining firm on these issues, New Delhi should also constructively engage with Bangladesh, laying an emphasis on people-to-people contacts, cultural exchanges, and developmental projects. Both countries must also continue their cooperation on the critical issues of border trade and smuggling, water sharing and refugee concerns. Maintaining this momentum will require New Delhi to proactively address prevailing anti-India and anti-Hindu sentiments in Bangladesh as well as capitalise on its economic engagement to reinforce its ties with Dhaka. Maintaining a constituency that is favourable to India within Bangladesh remains crucial for long-term strategic stability.

Aishwaria Sonavane is Research Analyst, Pakistan Desk at the Takshashila Institution